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Nearly all the peace accords signed in the last two decades have included power-sharing in one form or another. The notion of both majority and minority segments co-operating for the purposes of political stability has informed both international policy prescriptions for post-conflict zones and home-grown power-sharing pacts across the globe. This book examines the effect of power-sharing forms of governance in bringing about political stability amid deep divisions. It is the first major comparison of two power-sharing designs - consociationalism and centripetalism - and it assesses a.

Power-sharing may be a leading model for the inclusion of ethnic minorities in post-conflict government, but it is also considered a gender-blind approach to conflict regulation. In this article, I identify recent openings and shifts in power-sharing theory that suggest a new receptivity to the adoption of a gender perspective. Specifically, I focus on two major developments that have emerged over the last three decades – the widening of the power-sharing universe and the refinement of its institutional prescriptions – which have opened up analytical and political space for the inclusion of women in power-sharing theory. Building on these developments, I identify extant gender gaps in power-sharing theory, discuss strategies for overcoming them through the adoption of what I call least-ascriptive-most-prescriptive rules, and outline areas for future research on integrating a gender perspective into power-sharing theory and practice. While power-sharing theory may initially appear resistant to a gender intervention, I demonstrate there is new analytical space in the theory for such a venture.

This article assesses the articulation of vital ethno-national interests and the use and abuse of veto rights in deeply divided societies. In consociational theory, veto rights represent the primary means by which ethnic groups defend their 'vital interests', though they are often criticized for rewarding extremism and producing institutional instability. Situating a case study of Northern Ireland in a comparative perspective, I consider two lines of veto practice: liberal vs corporate (i.e. who has veto rights?) and permissive vs restrictive (i.e. to what issue areas do vetoes apply?), to assess what political incentives, if any, they offer for moderation and stability. Drawing from a review of the legislative debates when a veto was enacted and on semi-structured interviews with members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, I argue that a permissive approach, in which groups can determine their own vital interests, can contribute to moderation, peace and stability in divided societies.

This article focuses on power-sharing's 'exit dilemma'. While power-sharing may be a necessary transitional device to manage deep divisions, it also allegedly obstructs the long-term goals of peacebuilding and democratisation in divided societies. Three countervailing perspectives are considered here: (1) power-sharing is a transitional device unable to transition to more 'normal' political arrangements, creating instability; (2) power-sharing is a transitional device that can be designed for stability and adaptability; and (3) power-sharing is a lasting institutional fixture that facilitates peace and democratisation. The article presents a typology of pathways from power-sharing, arguing that the exit dilemma is real but not insurmountable.

Consociationalism is often proposed for societies deeply divided along ethnic lines, yet its recommendation remains contentious. Critics argue that it has a low rate of adoption, results in political immobilism, and entrenches the divisions it seeks to alleviate. Overlooked in much of the criticism, however, is the distinction between liberal and corporate forms of consociationalism, alternatively premised on the self-determination or predetermination of the ethnic groups involved in power-sharing. The article considers whether the critiques apply equally to both versions. Corporate consociation freezes a particular inter-group configuration in time, leading to drawn-out executive formation and, in some cases, to a cementing of divisions. However, liberal consociation runs into its own difficulties: consociational settlements are generally negotiated at the very point at which group identities are most politically salient and divisive. Under these conditions, groups are unlikely to settle for anything other than a guarantee of their share in power, thus making liberal consociationalism less likely to be adopted in negotiated settlements. The article also considers the factors enhancing the adoption of liberal consociational rules. Adapted from the source document.